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Abstract
The monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) is the subject matter of
this paper. We analyze the prospects for future price stability in an enlarged European
Monetary and Economic Union (EMU). At the heart of this study are the potential eﬀects
of altering decision-making procedure within the Governing Council of the ECB on price
stability in the eurozone. The authors compare the impact of three alternative reform
scenarios of the ECB Governing Council with the help of a voting-power analysis. It is
presumed that a considerable loss of current EMU-members’ inﬂuence power especially
in favour of joining Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) results in a loss of
monetary credibility of the ECB: As transparency of the decision-making process within
the ECB is lacking, markets may consider the ECB to be too much inclined to the economic
performances of the CEECs. This has then a negative impact on the level of price stability
in Europe. The voting-power analysis indicates which reform proposal is best with respect
to a price-stability benchmark.
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While ten new member countries 1 (NMC) joined the European Union (EU)
in May 2004, the next step towards the enlargement of the European Mone-
tary Union (EMU) is already being discussed in academics (see, for instance,
Berger et al. 2002; De La Dehesa 2003; Gros et al. 2002; Maier and Hen-
drikx 2002). Changes in the decision-making rules of the European Central
Bank (ECB) may be inevitable in order to cope with the enlargement of the
eurozone (Baldwin et al. 2000). Recently, the European Central Bank (ECB
2003) as well as the German Institute of Economic Research (DIW)—i.e.
Lommatzsch and Tober (2003)—published two practical relevant reform pro-
posals comprising new voting schemes for the decision-making bodies within
the ECB. Current members of EMU will lose inﬂuence on European mone-
tary policy making in favour of the newcomers. The NMC, in particular the
Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs), may be over-represented if no
reform would be passed (Berger 2002). As a result the eﬃcacy of ensuring
price stability in the eurozone may be impaired.
This paper inquires into the eﬀects of the newcomers’ admittance to the
eurozone on price stability in EMU. Our initial position is that the NMC’ and
in particular the CEECs’ adoption of the euro as legal tender provokes an in-
ﬂationary bias of the common currency. The crux is the reshaping of decision-
making procedures within the ECB in course of the EMU-enlargement on
market expectations. The number of actors in the ECB board, their voting-
behaviour—whether they are partisan or non-partisan—, and the voting
schemes in connection with present transparency regulations have a bear-
ing on those market expectations.
The analytical tool with which we tackle the research topic is voting-
power analysis. There exists a voluminous literature on voting power
1The list of accession countries comprises Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. In addition,
we consider “the Euro at 25” (Gros 2003)—i.e. Denmark, United Kingdom, and Sweden
adopting the euro, as well.
1analysis of EU institutions. These studies have estimated the power of the
member states in the Council of the EU (Berg 1999; Bilbao et al. 2002;
Schroeder 1998; Widgr´ en 1994), the European Parliament (Lane et al. 1995)
or both (Aleskerov et al. 2002; Nurmi and Meskanen 1999). Interestingly,
the ECB has rarely been a subject matter of voting-power analysis. This
study strives to close this gap. As a result, the voting-power analysis
indicates which of the currently debated reform proposal is best in terms of
ensuring price stability.
The remainder is structured as follows: Section 2 considers some gen-
eral aspects of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone relevant to
European monetary policy-making. The power-index literature, in partic-
ular the Banzhaf-indices, is reviewed in section 3. By the same token, we
outline alternative voting-behaviour of national members within the ECB.
Section 4 analyzes the present voting scheme of the ECB as well as of the
existing reform proposals. The empirical analysis of section 5 ascertains the
most appropriate reform scenario with respect to our benchmark—i.e. the
price stability objective of the ECB. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Crucial junctures of the EMU-enlargement
This section surveys the economic starting position of the NMC particularly
of the CEECs. In that way, we ﬁnd out something important about some
accession countries interests regarding rather growth promoting monetary
policies. These insights are connected with the formation of market expecta-
tions. The ECB’s communication policy towards the public is characterized
by limited transparency. The latter aﬀects market expectations and thus
inﬂation in the eurozone. The following considerations contribute to the later
analysis on partisan voting-behaviour of national central bank governors.
The eastward enlargement of the eurozone entails the inclusion of
2countries with a relative low level of capital endowment. In particular,
CEECs are replacing a relative obsolete capital stock. At the same time,
they are catching-up towards current members of EMU. This process of real
convergence requires capital inﬂux. Current account deﬁcits balance these
capital account surpluses. Higher real interest rates reﬂect that expected
rates of return—reﬂecting increasing productivity growth—in CEECs are
higher compared with current EMU-member countries. Thus, capital ﬂows
ensue. CEECs may favour relative low interest rates—albeit a levelling out
of the interest rate diﬀerential would certainly discomfort them—because
these would facilitate the ﬁnancing of CEECs’ catching-up. That is CEECs
can be suspected to opt for growth promoting monetary policy in an enlarged
eurozone. In turn, a common monetary policy can be too restrictive—i.e.
curtailing output and employment—for CEECs.2 In this regard, ambiguous
institutional changes within the decision-making process of the ECB can
put the price stability of the euro at stake. This applies particularly when
market sentiments expect the ECB to be too much inclined to CEECs’
concerns and to accept possibly higher inﬂation in the periphery, thus,
forfeiting credibility (cf. Baldwin et al. 2000: 26). This can entail setbacks
for the current level of price stability in the eurozone as the risk-premium of
the euro can rise and the ECB faces higher inﬂationary pressure.
According to Article 107(3) of the Treaty each EMU-member delegates
its monetary-policy competencies to the ECB’s two voting bodies depicted
in ﬁgure 1: The Executive Board (EB) consists of the ECB’s President, its
vice-president and four other EB-members.3 The Governing Council (GC)
consists of all EB-members plus national central bank (NCB)-governors of
the EMU-member countries.
The tasks of these two decision-making bodies are formally deﬁned by
2Sinn and Reutter (2001)—though in context of debating the appropriateness of the
Maastricht criteria for CEECs—already demanded a relaxation of the inﬂation-rate crite-
rion allowing for better prospects of real convergence in these countries.
3Currently (since 1 November 2003) the EB-members are France (President), Greece








Figure 1: The institutional structure of the ECB
Article 12(1) of the Protocol of the Statutes of the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB) (Protocol). The central responsibility falls on to the
GC that “shall adopt the guidelines and make the decisions necessary to
ensure the performance of the tasks entrusted to the ESCB” (Protocol, Art.
12(1)). Besides, the tasks of the EB are of operational matter—i.e. it “shall
implement monetary policy in accordance with the guidelines and decisions
laid down by the Governing Council” (Protocol, Art. 12 (1)).
In this context, the issue transparency is of high relevance. We broadly de-
ﬁne transparency as the degree of genuine understanding of monetary policy-
making of the ECB by the public (Winkler 2000: 7). This is to say, that the
ECB reveals enough about its analysis, internal deliberations and decision-
making processes for the public to see the logic behind each policy decision
(Blinder et al. 2001: xix). According to the present stance of the ECB’s
communication policy there is no disclosure of minutes and voting records
of the ECB board meetings. This kind of (in)transparency—whether it is
generally of advantage or disadvantage is not the subject matter of this pa-
per (see Hahn 2002 for an according survey of the literature)—aﬀects the
4formation of market expectations in a certain way. The ECB establishes an
information asymmetry vis-´ a-vis the public as it does not reveal its prefer-
ences regarding macroeconomic aggregates such as output and inﬂation. For
that reason, our considerations rely on an time-inconsistency model with in-
complete information in spirit of Barro and Gordon (1983).4 Accordingly,
the ECB’s accountability in terms of giving prominence to price stability is
impaired. This applies particularly when markets expect the ECB to be too
much inclined to CEECs’ aforementioned interests concerning relative low
(real) interest rates. If markets will accuse the ECB of ‘lax’ monetary policy,
then both current and new members of EMU will be stuck with a leap in
the euro’s risk premium. Therefore, higher interest rates may be required in
order to maintain the present level of price stability.
Summarily, given the current transparency regulations, the inclusion of
catching-up economies—in particular CEECs—engenders less price stability
or higher interest rates in the eurozone. This is due to the fact, that neither
the public can reconstruct the deliberations and voting decisions of the GC,
nor the ECB can make binding agreements vis-´ a-vis the public. The GC-
members’ voting behaviour as well as their potential inﬂuence on European
monetary policy-making is subject of the following section.
3 Voting power and behaviour
This section aims at introducing the idea of voting power indices especially
the Banzhaf indices. By the same token, we address partisan and non-
partisan voting behaviour.
Voting power of a member of a decision-making body is the extent to
which the member is able to aﬀect the outcome of a vote given a speciﬁc
decision-making rule or voting scheme. Generally, power indices inquire into
pivotal voters in a ballot, which turn a portion of voters in a winning coalition.
There are two diﬀerent strands of power indices (Felsenthal and Machover
4NB: The underlying model is not developed here.
51998, 2001). These two interpretations are distinguished as follows:
The ﬁrst understanding is that of power as inﬂuence. This speciﬁc con-
cept revolves around the extent to which a voter can aﬀect the outcome of
a division of a voting body. The according concept is labelled “I-power”.
The other concept concerns power as a voter’s expected relative share in
some prize, which is accordingly called “P-power” (Felsenthal and Machover
1998: 84). P-power, in contrast to I-power, has a distinct game-theoretic
notion. It presupposes oﬃce-seeking behaviour aimed at winning, since only
the winner can get a part of the prize. Unlike in the case of I-power, interac-
tion is an essential element of coalition formation. However, with respect to
the GC of the ECB the P-power indices—such as the Shapley-Shubik index
(Shapley and Shubik 1954, Shapley 1953)—are rather inappropriate. The
voting outcome of a ballot within the GC aﬀects both the winning and the
losing coalition. According to the rationale of I-power, voting behaviour is
motivated by policy-seeking. Therefore, monetary-policy decisions are pub-
lic goods rather than prizes which go to a winning coalition. A reasonable
way of explaining the idea of I-power mathematically is in terms of probabil-
ity (Berg 1999, Napel and Widgr´ en 2001; Nurmi and Meskanen 1999). The
power of a distinct voter in a given voting game is the a priori probability of
that voter being pivotal—i.e. being in a position to turn a winning coalition
into a losing one by withdrawing from it and vice versa. In this regard, the
Banzhaf indices are proper measures capturing essential characteristics of the
voting within the GC of the ECB.
This voting-power analysis aims at determining each minimal winning
coalition, at which at least—but not necessarily all—members of a winning
coalition can induce a change in European monetary policy-making. At this
point, we consider a voter’s impact on a voting outcome independent of the
sequential order of forming a coalition as all coalitions are equally likely.
Hence, the I-power indices are suited to measure the a priori power of cur-
rent EMU-members.5 In particular, the Banzhaf indices can account for the
5Most often, I-power indices are criticized for being independent of players’ preferences
6relative inﬂuence of each GC-member on the vote on European monetary
policy.
In a few words, the Banzhaf indices consider the set of all winning coali-
tions W that can be formed out of a set of players N = {1,...,n}.6 A
weighted voting game v consists, additionally, of a quota q and weighted
votes wi with i ∈ N. A coalition S ⊆ N is said to be a winning one, if
P
i∈S wi ≥ q. Therefore, a weighted voting game v is characterized by the
set of all winning coalitions W = {S ⊆ N|
P
i∈S wi ≥ q}. In order to calcu-
late a player’s voting power, the Banzhaf power indices refer to a concept of
‘swings’. The term ‘swing’ denotes a crucial member entering a coalition S,
as a result of which a losing coalition is turned into a winning one. In other
words, v can also be simply described as a function
v(S) =
(
1 if S ∈ W
0 else
.









The non-normalized or absolute Banzhaf index (aBI) is the sum of voter













In regard to our research focus a desirable property of a power index is having




The normalized Banzhaf index (nBI) value for voter i is obtained by dividing
the sum of i’s swings (regarding all possible 2n combinations) by the sum of























(see, for instance, Braham and Holler (2003) for further discussion).
6The subsequent representation of the Banzhaf follow to a great extent Schr¨ oder (1998).
7The nBI can be interpreted as measuring each voter’s relative share among
all pivotal positions (Berg 1999: 20).
Apart from voting power, the voters’ behaviour is also of relevance.
This concerns alternatively partisan and non-partisan behaviour of GC-
members. There are a number of reasons to assume that NCB-governors
within EMU are concerned about domestic structures at home. This issues
has been frequently debated in academics.
Alesina and Grilli (1991) agree that NCB-governors represent their na-
tional interests at the ECB as each EMU-member country has the oppor-
tunity to participate and aﬀect the policy choice through its central bank
governor. Von Hagen and S¨ uppel (1994) and De Grauwe et al. (1998) base
their models of monetary policy on the assumption that the countries rep-
resentatives consider national inﬂation and output objectives.7 It is also
established in literature that “national central banks may care about a pol-
icy that accommodates macroeconomic shocks in their own country while
taking a collective decision about common monetary policy” (Gr¨ uner 2001:
4).
The national-bias assumption may be less realistic in case of the EB-
members, particularly with regard to the ECB President, as mentioned by
Chapell et al. (1995). However, it can be presumed that the EB-members
are also inclined to the economic prospects home country (cf. Vaubel 1999).
Although, Article 105 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(Treaty) obliges them to impartiality and euro-mindedness. Nevertheless,
Dornbusch et al. (1998: 26) assume that in the end all GC-members vote in
favour of their national constituency’s interests.
In line with these considerations and similar to Gr¨ uner (1999) and
Mangano (1999) our calculations take partisan and non-partisan voting be-
7The very same is claimed regarding the United States: Krause (1996), Gildea (1992),
and Knott (1986) suggest that the decisions within the Federal Reserve Board are inﬂu-
enced by regional, industrial and commercial interests of primary constituencies.
8haviour into account. First, EB-members are assumed to act according to
the ECB statute as an entirely separate entity exclusively concerned with
price stability in the EMU-12 and at the EMU-25 respectively.8 At the same
time, the other GC-members disregard their obligation and consider solely
domestic macroeconomic aggregates. EB-members are accordingly denoted
as “non-partisan”. In turn, every NCB-governor will be assumed to repre-
sent domestic preferences when voting on European monetary policy—i.e.
they display “partisan” behaviour. The second set of assumptions assumes
that all GC-members including the EB-members are guided by domestic
concerns—i.e. displaying exclusively partisan behaviour.
4 The ECB in reform process
In the following, we overview present reform proposals and scenarios. The
section starts with sketching the current institutional framework of the ECB
(see, for details, ECB 1999). In general, we aim at determining the various
(weighted) voting schemes for the subsequent calculations.
Since the GC shall “formulate the monetary policy of the Community”
(ECB 1999: 64), its composition and the formal decision-making procedures
are the main research subjects at this stage of analysis. Regarding this,
Article 10(2) of the Protocol says that decisions are to be taken by a simple
majority on a one member - one vote basis. If the vote is tied, the ECB’s
President will have a decisive vote.9 Past decisions of the ECB have been
taken unanimously as pointed out by Linder and Olechowski-Hrdlicka (2002).
Nevertheless, it is assumed that decisions are to be taken by simple majority
in the following. This presumption is supported by Berger and De Haan
(2002), who assume that unanimous decisions will be less probable in course
of an EMU-enlargement.
8For reasons of simplicity, EB-members are assumed to decide collectively.
9Actually, the voting power of the country whose representative is the ECB President
should be weighted more. The reader should note, however, that our calculations do not
take this into account at the moment.
9In order to receive a reference value—i.e. our price stability bench (see
above)—we calculate the temporary voting power distribution within the
ECB as follows: Equivalent to the current distribution of EB-members, six
countries get additional voting weights in the partisan-scenario. With regard
to the assumptions in the preceding section, there are two weighted voting
games with 12 or 13 players formally described by:
• “Non-Partisan”: [6, 1, ..., 1; 9] with n = 13
• “Partisan”: [2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1; 9] with n = 12.
4.1 Scenario 1: Enlarging the status quo
This scenario considers an enlargement of those ten NMC joining the EU-15
in 2004 plus the three current ‘members with a derogation’ (namely Denmark,
Sweden and the UK) to an EMU-25. In regard to the status quo it is assumed
that the voting-distribution scheme as well as the composition of the EB
remain unchanged10, so that
• “Non-partisan”: [6, 1, ..., 1; 16], with n = 26
• “Partisan”: [2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, ..., 1; 16], with n = 25.
4.2 Scenario 2: The reform proposal of the ECB
After a long time of tough negotiations, the ECB ﬁnally agreed on a re-
form model (ECB 2003: 79-90) which is ﬁercely debated (see, for instance,
Dvorsky and Lindner 2003, Lommatzsch and Tober 2003). However, the
passage of a reform of the ECB decision-making system was urgent to keep
an enlarged ECB capable of acting.11 The principle of rotation will be intro-
duced gradually: As soon as the 22nd Member State will join the euro area,
10The ﬁxed composition of the EB is indeed an unrealistic assumption as the enlargement
process will certainly lead to changes. It serves as a cross bench for the case that no reform
is implemented at all.
11The reform proposal of the ECB has been approved—after Finland and the Nether-
lands have put aside their reservations—in March 2003. However, this reform of the ECB
10the system will operate on the basis of three groups (see table 1). The ﬁrst




























Table 1: Relative share of votes in the ECB scenario
group consists of the ﬁve governors from the euro area countries occupying
the highest positions in the country ranking. This group shares four voting
rights. The second group comprises half of all governors, rounded up to the
nearest full number, and has three voting rights. Finally the third group is
composed of the remaining governors, who share three voting rights.
The division into groups is based on the ranking of governors’ respec-
can still break down. The proposal has to be ratiﬁed by national parliaments in current
EU-member countries until the end of April 2004. If the ratiﬁcation process fails the
reform of the ECB will be again on the agenda.
11tive member states, depending on a composite indicator consisting of two
weighted components: the GDP at market prices (5/6 weight) and the share
of a member state in the total aggregated balance sheet of the monetary
ﬁnancial institutions (1/6 weight) (see ECB 2003: 77).
Regarding the voting power calculations, the division is based on data by
Dvorsky and Lindner (2003). Obviously, this group is not ﬁxed, but able to
change at any time. Especially the diﬀerence between the second and the
third group is quite so small that ﬂuctuations are likely to occur. In order to
be able to compare the diﬀerent scenarios concerning shifts in voting powers
it is assumed that this division will not be changed in the near future. In
respect of the ‘partisan scenario’ it is assumed that each of the three groups
has two members in the EB, accordingly:
• “Non-Partisan”: [6, 4, 8, 3; 11] with n = 4
• “Partisan”: [6, 10, 5; 11], with n = 3.
4.3 Scenario 3: Reform ´ a la DIW
The DIW published an institutional ECB reform model (Lommatzsch and
Tober 2003) as well (see table 2). After the harsh criticisms of the ECB-
reform concept, this scenario is used to compare possible diﬀerences in voting
power. This scenario is also based on the principle of rotation, but in contrast
to the ECB scenario the DIW proposes only the smaller countries to rotate
whereas the bigger countries have a permanent right to vote. Furthermore,
the four biggest economies even have the right to propose the EB governors.
The according rationale can be based on the previously discussed objections
that the ECB’s monetary reputation would be impaired in course of enlarging
the eurozone towards the ten NMC. As far as possible, the eight groups are
divided by regional criteria. Otherwise, the relative share of GDP and the
relative share of population (both equally weighted) serve as an indicator
in order to group the countries (see table 2). The DIW proposal can be
described by:
12GDP (in %) Population (in %) Votes
GER 22,4 18,2 1
UK 17,2 13,3 1
FRA 15,8 13,1 1
ITA 13,2 12,7 1
ESP 7,0 8,9 1
POL 2,1 8,5 1
NED 4,6 3,5 1
SWE 2,6 2,0
DEN 2,0 1,2 1
FIN 1,5 1,1
BEL 2,8 2,3
IRL 1,2 0,8 1
LUX 0,2 0,1
AUT 2,3 1,8
POR 1,3 2,2 1
SLO 0,2 0,4
GRE 1,4 2,3
CYP 0,1 0,2 1
MAL 0,0 0,1
CZE 0,7 2,3
HUN 0,6 2,3 1
SLK 0,2 1,2
LIT 0,1 0,8




Table 2: Relative share of votes in the DIW scenario
• “Non-Partisan”: [4, 1, ..., 1; 9] with n = 14
• “Partisan”: [2, 2, 2, 2, 1, ..., 1; 9] with n = 13.
After having determined the weighted voting rules of each reform scenario
as well as of our reference scenario ‘status quo’ of EMU-12, we turn to the
calculations of the Banzhaf indices in the following.
135 Empirical analysis
This section deals with the calculated Banzhaf indices.12 Table 3 provides
an overview of the calculations for the nBI and the aBI with regard to our
reference value of the status quo and the three reform scenarios. At the same
time, the scenarios are distinguished into the “partisan” and “non-partisan”
alternatives.
The overview in table 3 clariﬁes that the economic weight of the EMU-
members is of no relevance to their voting power. Actually, it is only the
number of votes which aﬀects voting power. Hence, each aBI and nBI of
the status quo of the EMU-12 and at the EMU-25 are identical across all
countries concerning the non-partisan alternative. Regarding the presumed
partisan behaviour, the results are identical with respect to each group, too.
Due to the Banzhaf indices’ properties the relative share of votes is only
an appropriate indicator of voting power in exceptional cases. It is a proper
measure in case of the status-quo for the EMU-25, at which, for instance,
the relative share of Germany in the EMU-25 scenario is 2/31 = 0.0645
whereas its nBI amounts 0.0655 from the partisan angle. However, the
very same indicator fails in respect of a non-partisan environment for the
present EMU-12. At this point, Germany’s relative share corresponds to
1/18 = 0.0555 and is hence 60 % higher than the value of its nBI amounting
to 0.0346.
Shifts in the relative inﬂuences of the EB are of particular interest to
our study. Resuming our considerations on the dismal prospects for future
price stability in an enlarged EMU (see section 2), it will be desirable to
have a non-partisan EB with a great deal of inﬂuence. We suppose that the
higher the inﬂuence of the EB, the easier it is to ensure price stability in an
enlarged eurozone. This is because market expectations are kept in check.
The results in table 3 show that the voting power of the EB ranges
12We have used Powerslave—a voting power program by the Finland University of
Tartu—and IOP a programme by the University of Konstanz (see references).
14Status quo of the EMU-12 Status quo at the EMU-25 ECB Scenario DIW Scenario
Non-Partisan Partisan Non-Partisan Partisan Non-Partisan Partisan Non-Partisan Partisan
nBI aBI nBI aBI nBI aBI nBI aBI nBI aBI nBI aBI nBI aBI nBI aBI
GER 0,0346 0,0537 0,1124 0,2930 0,0287 0,0779 0,0655 0,2483 0,0333 0,0500 0,0660 0,1000 0,0524 0,1208 0,1204 0,3296
UK 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0333 0,0500 0,0660 0,1000 0,0524 0,1208 0,1204 0,3296
FRA 0,0346 0,0537 0,1124 0,2930 0,0287 0,0779 0,0655 0,2483 0,0333 0,0500 0,0660 0,1000 0,0524 0,1208 0,1204 0,3296
ITA 0,0346 0,0537 0,1124 0,2930 0,0287 0,0779 0,0655 0,2483 0,0333 0,0500 0,0660 0,1000 0,0524 0,1208 0,1204 0,3296
ESP 0,0346 0,0537 0,1124 0,2930 0,0287 0,0779 0,0655 0,2483 0,0333 0,0500 0,0660 0,1000 0,0524 0,1208 0,0576 0,1577
POL 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0524 0,1208 0,0576 0,1577
NED 0,0346 0,0537 0,0543 0,1416 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0524 0,1208 0,0576 0,1577
SWE 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
DEN 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
FIN 0,0346 0,0537 0,0543 0,1416 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
BEL 0,0346 0,0537 0,0543 0,1416 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
IRL 0,0346 0,0537 0,0543 0,1416 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
LUX 0,0346 0,0537 0,0543 0,1416 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
AUT 0,0346 0,0537 0,1124 0,2930 0,0287 0,0779 0,0655 0,2483 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
POR 0,0346 0,0537 0,0543 0,1416 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
SLO 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0238 0,0357 0,0471 0,0714 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
GRE 0,0346 0,0537 0,1124 0,2930 0,0287 0,0779 0,0655 0,2483 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
CYP 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0238 0,0357 0,0471 0,0714 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
MAL 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0238 0,0357 0,0471 0,0714 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
CZE 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
HUN 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0385 0,0577 0,0254 0,0385 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
SLK 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0238 0,0357 0,0471 0,0714 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
LIT 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0238 0,0357 0,0471 0,0714 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
LET 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0238 0,0357 0,0471 0,0714 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
EST 0,0287 0,0779 0,0319 0,1211 0,0238 0,0357 0,0471 0,0714 0,0175 0,0403 0,0192 0,0526
EB 0,5848 0,9077 0,2834 0,7705 0,1667 0,2500 0,3182 0,7332
Table 3: Calculations of Banzhaf indices
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5from 16.7 % (ECB Scenario) to 58.5 % (Status quo of the EMU-12). At
present, the EB is quite powerful as it exhibits signiﬁcantly more voting
power (58.5%) than its relative share of votes would imply (6 out of 18,
i.e. 33.3%). Accordingly, the EB rather stands as ﬁrm as a rock. This
is possibly why market expectations concerning inﬂation can presently be
curbed. However, the inﬂuence of the EB will diminish in course of the
eastward enlargement of the eurozone. Supposing the DIW scenario is put
through, the voting power of the EB almost halves to 31.8%. If the ECB
reform is really implemented, the inﬂuence of the EB will even shrink to
16.7%.13
An assessment of the quality of diﬀerent reform scenarios against the
background of price stability in the eurozone requires a comparison of alter-
native outcomes in diﬀerent scenarios. The results of the calculations—in
relation to the nBI—are summarized in table 4.
It is obvious that all current members of EMU will lose inﬂuence, if the
status quo of the voting scheme in the GC is simply preserved after the NMC’
admittance to the eurozone. This applies certainly to both the partisan and
the non-partisan attitude. In respect of the latter, the loss of I-power for
the biggest economies of the eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) is
only marginal (-0.1%) in the ECB scenario when compared to the status quo
at the EMU-25. At the same time, the status of the remaining current EMU-
members is enhanced (0.4%). Interestingly, when comparing the non-partisan
DIW scenario with the status quo of the GC’s decision-making procedure
the signs of the results are rather reversed. Though, the Netherlands are the
exception. In addition, the changes even range from -1.7% to 1.8%.
As regards the partisan perspectives, the relative sizable variations of
changes in national members’s inﬂuences is apparent. When comparing
13NB: A similar argument can be made in respect of the current EMU-12 in comparison
with the status quo at the EMU-25. If the status quo of the voting scheme in the GC is
not altered, then the voting power of the entire group EMU-12 declines to about 70% in
the EMU-25 (not displayed in any table).
16Relative Gains and Losses from of the ... to the EMU-12 Relative Gains and Losses from of the ... to the EMU-25
EMU-25 ECB Scenario DIW Scenario ECB Scenario DIW Scenario
Non-Partisan Partisan Non-Partisan Partisan Non-Partisan Partisan Non-Partisan Partisan Non-Partisan Partisan
GER -0,6% -4,7% -0,1% -4,6% 1,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,1% 2,4% 5,5%
UK 0,5% 3,4% 2,4% 8,9%
FRA -0,6% -4,7% -0,1% -4,6% 1,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,1% 2,4% 5,5%
ITA -0,6% -4,7% -0,1% -4,6% 1,8% 0,8% 0,5% 0,1% 2,4% 5,5%
ESP -0,6% -4,7% -0,1% -4,6% 1,8% -5,5% 0,5% 0,1% 2,4% -0,8%
POL 1,0% -0,7% 2,4% 2,6%
NED -0,6% -2,2% 0,4% -2,9% 1,8% 0,3% 1,0% -0,7% 2,4% 2,6%
SWE 1,0% -0,7% -1,1% -1,3%
DEN 1,0% -0,7% -1,1% -1,3%
FIN -0,6% -2,2% 0,4% -2,9% -1,7% -3,5% 1,0% -0,7% -1,1% -1,3%
BEL -0,6% -2,2% 0,4% -2,9% -1,7% -3,5% 1,0% -0,7% -1,1% -1,3%
IRL -0,6% -2,2% 0,4% -2,9% -1,7% -3,5% 1,0% -0,7% -1,1% -1,3%
LUX -0,6% -2,2% 0,4% -2,9% -1,7% -3,5% 1,0% -0,7% -1,1% -1,3%
AUT -0,6% -4,7% 0,4% -8,7% -1,7% -9,3% 1,0% -4,0% -1,1% -4,6%
POR -0,6% -2,2% 0,4% -2,9% -1,7% -3,5% 1,0% -0,7% -1,1% -1,3%
SLO -0,5% 1,5% -1,1% -1,3%
GRE -0,6% -4,7% 0,4% -8,7% -1,7% -9,3% 1,0% -4,0% -1,1% -4,6%
CYP -0,5% 1,5% -1,1% -1,3%
MAL -0,5% 1,5% -1,1% -1,3%
CZE 1,0% -0,7% -1,1% -1,3%
HUN 1,0% -0,7% -1,1% -1,3%
SLK -0,5% 1,5% -1,1% -1,3%
LIT -0,5% 1,5% -1,1% -1,3%
LET -0,5% 1,5% -1,1% -1,3%
EST -0,5% 1,5% -1,1% -1,3%
EB -30,1% -41,8% -26,7% -11,7% 3,5%
Table 4: Comparison of diﬀerent reform scenarios
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7the ECB- and the DIW scenario with the EMU-25 baseline similar changes
occur—however, under changed signs. In this context, a very interesting re-
sult is that partisan behaviour makes almost all of the current EMU-members
comparatively worse oﬀ. This applies to all countries that have no “wild
card” in the DIW scenario as well as to the rotation procedure in the ECB
scenario.
A comparison of the topical reform proposals by the ECB and the DIW
is of particular interest when we assess the prospective impact of the EMU-
enlargement on future price stability in the eurozone. At this stage, we are
particular concerned with the non-partisan EB stance. Again, it is obvious
that the EB loses inﬂuence when ten—respectively thirteen—new members
enter the GC. It is very alarming that particularly the ECB-proposal, which
will probably carried through, deteriorates the EB’s status most (c. 42%).
Most notably, the EB will be even more worse oﬀ compared to the present
status quo (c. 30%). In respect of the DIW-proposal, the EB’s inﬂuence
shrinks ‘only’ in amount of almost 27%. As regards the status quo at the
EMU-25, this reform proposals rather strengthens the position of the EB
(3.5%), whereas the ECB-proposals makes the EB worse oﬀ (c. -12%). As
regards the price-stability benchmark, we would, therefore, prefer the DIW
scenario.
6 Conclusion
The voting-power analysis of changing inﬂuences of national members in the
ECB highlights some interesting results. This applies particularly in regard
to the prospects of future inﬂation in the enlarged eurozone.
We have developed a relationship between the NMC’ especially CEECs’
demand for a rather growth promoting stance of the common monetary pol-
icy, the present degree of (in)transparency of the decision-making process
within the ECB, and altering market expectations. Supposing a linear rela-
tion between the reshaping of current EMU-members’ inﬂuence in the GC
18and inﬂation expectations this study has evaluated three diﬀerent scenarios.
The assessment is carried out with regard to the impact of the reshaping of
decision-making in the ECB on the price stability in the enlarged eurozone.
In particular, we have inquired in the EMU at 25 given that the voting scheme
of the GC remains unchanged, the ECB scenario—which will probably put
through—and the DIW scenario as the latest alternative reform proposal.
The calculations of the Banzhaf indices have shown some interesting re-
sults: First, fears of considerable loss of current EMU-members’ inﬂuence
on European monetary policy are well-founded. When comparing partisan
and non-partisan behaviour, second, current EMU-members (particularly rel-
ative small economies) will be rather worse oﬀ if they resort to partisan
behaviour—i.e. when their voting-behaviour is especially inclined too do-
mestic structures. Therefore, this counterintuitive result rather suggests a
strengthening of actual monetary independence as this can enhance those
countries status—as indicated by the according calculations of non-partisan
behaviour. Third, in respect of the presumed price stability benchmark the
reform proposal of the ECB is even worse than the status quo. In contrast,
the DIW-reform proposal mitigates the possibly negative impact of NMC’
admittance to EMU on the euro’s price stability. Certainly, no reform can
compensate the loss of inﬂuence of current EMU-members. This generally
applies as long as peripheral countries are coming up, which are associated
with attitudes toward a rather growth promoting monetary policy stance
compared to core countries. Therefore, both current and prospective mem-
bers of EMU may consider a revision of the ECB’s transparency rules. Such
revision may result in a more price stable monetary equilibrium in the euro-
zone.
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EMU-enlargement and the Reshaping of  
Decision-making within the ECB Governing 
Council: A Voting-Power Analysis 
 
Abstract 
The monetary union of the European Central Bank (ECB) is the subject matter of this 
paper. We analyze the prospects for future price stability in an enlarged European 
Monetary and Economic Union (EMU). At the heart of this study are the potential 
effects of altering decision-making procedure within the Governing Council of the 
ECB on price stability in the eurozone. The authors compare the impact of three 
alternative reform scenarios of the ECB Governing Council with the help of a voting-
power analysis. It is presumed that a considerable loss of current EMU-members’ 
influence power especially in favour of joined new member countries (NMC) results in 
a loss of monetary credibility of the ECB: As transparency of the decision-making 
process within the ECB is lacking, markets may consider the ECB to be too much 
inclined to the economic performances of the NMCs. This has then a negative impact 
on the level of price stability in Europe. The voting-power analysis indicates which 
reform proposal is best with respect to a price-stability benchmark. 
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